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Speechlessness and Trauma: Why the
International Criminal Court Needs a Public
Interviewing Guide
Philip A. Sandick*
“The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical
and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and
witnesses.”
—Rome Statute, article 68(1)
“The ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness.
Certain violations of the social compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this
is the meaning of the word unspeakable.”
—JUDITH HERMAN, M.D., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL
TERROR 1 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Trauma is a narrative fracture. Psychologically, a traumatic event is defined by its
inability to fit within one’s linear meaning structure. Neuroscience teaches that memories
of traumatic events are even stored in a different part of the brain from regular, narrative
memories. This article looks at how the narrative fracture of trauma influences
interviewers, interviewees, and the judicial process at the International Criminal Court
(the Court or the ICC). Since interviewing techniques can have positive and negative
effects on both the speaker and the listener, this article argues that the ICC has, at the
very least, a duty under the Rome System1 to prevent the negative effects of interviewing
to the extent possible within its resources. It concludes by suggesting ways to start that
process.

*

Candidate for J.D. and LL.M. in International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law,
2014. With thanks to David Scheffer, Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director of
the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern Law, and to my supervisors at the International
Criminal Court who deepened my understanding of the issues raised in this article, Didier Preira, Ira
Goldberg, and Cyril Laucci, and to the individuals who allowed me to interview them for this piece, Fiona
MacKay, An Michels, Michaela Bauer, and Vedrana Mladina. The views expressed herein, as well as all
errors and omissions, are my own.
1
“Rome System” refers to the statutory and regulatory documents of the Court, Counsel, and the Trust
Fund for Victims. These include the Rome Statute (ICCSt), the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(RPE), the Regulations of each of the Organs, and any other documents that have binding effect on
operations of the respective entity.
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Much of the recent discussion of victim participation revolves around
intermediaries.2 Intermediaries are individuals and/or groups on the ground in situation
countries that are relied upon by multiple organs and units of the Court and counsel for
various reasons. After all, the Court cannot be everywhere at once with its limited
resources. The Court also cannot know all of the local customs, languages, and slang.
Intermediaries solve these and other problems.3
Anyone can be an intermediary; no standard training is required—or, generally,
offered.4 Intermediaries can be friends or family members of victims, or they can be
“post-conflict justice junkies”5 or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are
“devoted to promoting post-conflict justice.”6 States themselves can even be
intermediaries.7 Sometimes the Court has the ability to choose the intermediary, and
sometimes it doesn’t, i.e., when a victim says he will only communicate with the Court
through a particular interlocutor.
Many intermediary tasks involve talking directly with victims, but intermediaries
often do not know how to do so. That knowledge is important because appropriate
interviewing techniques have been shown to decrease victims’ Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) symptoms and to decrease the likelihood of both victim
retraumatization and interviewer vicarious traumatization. Conversely, improper
interviewing techniques have been shown to increase PTSD symptoms and cause
retraumatization and vicarious traumatization.
Right now, victims are suffering as a result of the work of the Court. Their harm is
sometimes caused by negative experiences in interviews either during investigations or at
trial. Other times, it is caused by the procedural reality that a victim’s status, and
therefore a victim’s rights, may shift throughout trial. When a victim’s rights shift and
they are no longer involved in proceedings, an interview may form the bulk of their
interaction with the Court. Some studies show that victims judge the justice they receive
more by their treatment during the trial than by the trial’s outcome. Under this theory,
better interviewing would result in both less suffering and more perceived justice.
Intermediaries are also suffering because they do not know how to talk to victims.
Two NGOs that regularly work with the Court, the International Refugee Rights Initiative
2

See, e.g., Caroline Buisman, Delegating Investigations: Lessons to be Learned from the Lubanga
Judgment, 11 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 30 (2013).
3
See Holly Dranginis, The Middle Man: The Intermediaries of International Criminal Justice, JUSTICE IN
CONFLICT (Aug. 21, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/
08/21/the-middle-man-the-intermediaries-of-international-criminal-justice/.
4
The author has personal knowledge that when a training program for intermediaries from a particular
situation was held at the seat of the Court, there was no training on how to talk with victims because the
organizer was not aware that such training existed or was possible. The author was informed that the
organizer would not have hesitated to arrange that training had the organizer known about it.
5
Elena Baylis, Tribunal Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 361, 364
(2008).
6
Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 126 (2009).
7
ICC, Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims, Regulation 67, ICC-ASP/4/Res.3 (Dec. 3, 2005) (“The
Trust Fund may decide to use intermediaries to facilitate the disbursement of reparations awards, as
necessary, where to do so would provide greater access to the beneficiary group and would not create any
conflict of interest. Intermediaries may include interested States, intergovernmental organizations, as well
as national or international nongovernmental organizations working in close proximity with the beneficiary
groups.”).
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(IRRI) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), have written that their
intermediaries have “suffered deep trauma as a result of [their work for the court].”8 They
specifically asked for training “in techniques relating to approaching and handling
potential witnesses.”9 IRRI and OSJI are not alone in their cries for help, but that help has
not been forthcoming.
The Court is currently in the process of promulgating guidelines governing
relations between the Court and intermediaries (the Guidelines).10 The author worked on
these guidelines during his time at the Court in Spring 2012. The Guidelines are largely a
response to the problems that arose in the Prosecution’s use of intermediaries in Lubanga.
As such, the Guidelines rightly cover many fundamental issues, e.g., the definition of
intermediaries and the legal and policy framework governing utilization of
intermediaries. But the Guidelines do not mention prophylactic psychosocial measures
designed to protect intermediaries and victims from unintended trauma.11
The number of victims involved in proceedings is only increasing,12 so knowing
how to talk to victims on behalf of the Court is becoming a bigger issue by the day. This
paper advocates specifically for the adoption of interviewing guidelines for all
individuals interacting with traumatized individuals for and on behalf of the Court. A
failure to promulgate interviewing guidelines at this crucial moment of guideline
advancement is tantamount to the Court neglecting its obligation to protect and support
victims, witnesses, and those who are at risk on account of their work for or on behalf of
the Court.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

¶9

Multiple provisions of Rome System texts affirm both that victims and others
involved in the work of the Court have various rights and that the Court is the
corresponding duty-bearer for those rights. In addition, the jurisprudence of the Court
shows that rights can shift throughout a given procedure. While the Court’s duty to
protect and support the psychosocial well-being of victims and intermediaries exists in
the provisions of Rome System texts, the fact that rights and roles shift offers an
additional reason to issue meaningful victim interview policies.
8

International Refugee Rights Initiative and the Open Society Justice Initiative, Commentary on the ICC
Draft Guidelines on Intermediaries, INT’L REFUGEE RTS. INITIATIVE 1, 16 (Aug. 2011),
http://www.refugee-rights.org/Assets/PDFs/2011/iccintermediaries-commentary-20110818.pdf.
9
Id. at 21; but see Dranginis, supra note 3 (arguing that intermediaries generally know how to talk to
traumatized individuals, and what they really need is payment for their services).
10
The author worked on the Guidelines and associated documents during his four-month assignment at the
Court from January to May of 2012. The Guidelines were presented to the Assembly of States Parties in
December 2012 at its eleventh assembly.
11
OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, INTERMEDIARIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
ROLE FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES 1 (Dec. 2011),
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/intermediaries20111212/intermediaries-20111212.pdf (hereinafter “OSJI 2011 Report”).
12
The average number of participation applications received per month by the Court increased over 300%
from 2010 to 2011. This number excludes both applications for reparations as well as representations made
under Article 15. Though the data are not yet available for 2012, the number has not decreased. Interview
with Soraya Birziki, Victims Participation and Reparations Section, International Criminal Court, in The
Hague, Neth. (Mar. 28, 2012).
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A. Protection and Support for Victims
¶10

The Rome System gives victims rights both at the investigation stage and at the
trial stage. At the investigation stage, any person “[s]hall not be subjected to any form of
coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”13 During the course of an investigation, the Prosecutor “shall .
. . respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses,”14 and
“may” take necessary measures to ensure “the protection of any person.”15 The Pre-Trial
Chamber (PTC) may, “[w]here necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of
victims and witnesses” and “the protection of persons who have been arrested or
appeared in response to a summons.”16
¶11
At the trial stage, “[t]he Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard
for the protection of victims and witnesses.”17 The Trial Chamber (TC) also may
“[p]rovide for the protection of the accused, witnesses and victims.”18 Most importantly
with regard to the trial stage, article 68(1) of the Rome Statute (ICCSt) gives “the Court”
the mandate to protect victims and witnesses:
[t]he Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical
and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and
witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors,
including [age, gender, health, and nature of the crime], in particular, but
not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or
violence against children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes.19
¶12

In addition, the ICCSt provides for a Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) within
the Registry.20 The VWU “shall provide . . . counseling and other appropriate assistance
for witnesses [and] victims who appear before the Court,”21 “shall . . . [assist victims and
witnesses] in obtaining . . . psychological and other appropriate assistance,”22 and “shall .
. . [make] available to the Court and the parties training in issues of trauma.”23 The
greater a victim’s involvement with the Court, the greater the rights that victim acquires,
and the greater the Court’s duties to respect and protect those rights. The Appeals
Chamber has used primarily these statutory provisions to extend protection to nonwitnesses and non-victims, including intermediaries.24
13

Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court art. 55(1)(b) (Nov. 29, 2010) (hereinafter “ICCSt”).
Id. art. 54(1)(b) (emphasis added).
15
Id. art. 54(3)(f).
16
Id. art. 57(3)(c).
17
Id. art. 64(2).
18
Id. art. 64(6)(e).
19
Id. art. 68(1) (emphasis added).
20
Id. art. 43(6).
21
Id. art. 43(6).
22
INT’L CRIM. CT. R. P. EVID. 17(2)(a)(iii) (hereinafter “ICC RPE”).
23
ICC RPE 17(2)(a)(iv).
24
ICC, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for
14
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B. Protection and Support for Intermediaries

¶13

Texts in the Rome System do not specifically mention intermediaries. However, the
texts do mention general classes of persons who may be put at risk on account of the
Court’s activities, and the jurisprudence of the Court has found intermediaries to fall into
this category. The question is then what rights intermediaries have at what point in the
proceeding.
¶14
In Katanga, the Appeals Chamber (AC) began the process of expanding protection
to include intermediaries. The issue first arose when the AC was asked to discern
whether the Court could authorize non-disclosure to the Defense prior to trial of, among
other things, the identities of intermediaries contained in witness statements.25 In keeping
with equality of arms and a fair trial, the general principle is disclosure to the Defense of
evidence that will be presented against defendants.26 As noted above, article 54(3)(f) of
the Rome Statute permits the Prosecutor to “take necessary measures . . . to ensure . . . the
protection of any person.”27 But the Rule that specifically addresses nondisclosure only
allows the Chamber “to protect the safety of witnesses and victims and members of their
families, including by authorizing the non-disclosure of their identities.”28 The
intermediaries at issue thus did not fall within the Rule (victims, witnesses, and family
members), but they did fall within the article (any person). The Appeals Chamber held
that the Rule, Rule 81(4), “should be read to include the words ‘persons at risk on
account of the activities of the Court’ so as to reflect the intention of the States that
adopted the Statute and [RPEs] to protect people at risk.”29
¶15
The AC found that intention in numerous provisions of the ICCSt and the RPE.
Article 43(6) creates the VWU, which
shall provide . . . protective measures and security arrangements,
counseling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who
appear before the Court, and others who are at risk on account of
testimony given by such witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with
expertise in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual
violence.30
¶16

Rules 16-18 of the RPE, detailing the affirmative duties of the Registrar and the
VWU, each contain the phrase “others who are at risk on account of testimony given.”31
Specifically with regard to the duties of the Registrar, she shall inform these other people
of their rights and of the “existence, functions and availability” of the VWU, and ensure
that they are aware of any decisions that affect their rights.32 The Registrar also may
Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements”, ¶¶ 40–56 (May 13, 2008) (hereinafter “Katanga, ICC-01/0401/07-475”).
25
Id.
26
ICCSt arts. 61(3)(b), 61(6); ICC RPE 76(1), 76(4).
27
Id. art. 54(3)(f).
28
ICC RPE 81(4).
29
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 56.
30
ICCSt art. 43(6) (emphasis added).
31
See Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 50.
32
ICC RPE 16(2)(a)–(b).
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negotiate “[a]greements on relocation and provision of support services on the territory of
a State of traumatized or threatened victims, witnesses, and others who are at risk on
account of testimony given by such witnesses.”33 The AC found that these provisions
“are indicative of an overarching concern to ensure that persons are not unjustifiably
exposed to risk through the activities of the Court.”34
¶17
Duties of the VWU arising out of the RPE have similar reach. The mandate of the
VWU extends to “all witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and others who are
at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses.”35 For all of those persons, the
VWU “shall” assist them in obtaining “psychological and other appropriate assistance.”36
The VWU is also tasked with “[m]aking available to the Court and the parties training in
issues of trauma.”37 Rule 87 affords protection to “another person at risk on account of
testimony given by a witness,”38 and Rule 59(2) notes the Court’s duty regarding “the
protection of any person.”39
¶18
Partially relying on portions of the above reasoning, the Appeals Chamber held that
“the States that adopted the Statute and the [RPE intended] to protect people at risk.”40
The Court has upheld—and has never altered—the extension of protection to those “at
risk on account of the activities of the Court.”41 Intermediaries are not barred from this
protection.
C. Determining Victims and Those At Risk
¶19

Determination of the appropriate level of protection and/or support begs the
question of who is properly termed a victim, a witness, or an at risk person.
¶20
Due to the asymmetry of information at different levels of trial, however, the
standards for victim identification differ at the various phases of judicial proceedings.
RPE 85(a) establishes the criteria for victimhood at the Court, whether one is a natural or
juridical person.42 RPE 85(a) states that “‘[v]ictims’ means natural persons who have
suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court.”43 RPE 85(a) has been interpreted to comprise four elements, each of which must
be satisfied to obtain the status of victim: the victim 1) must be a natural person who 2)

33

Id. 16(4).
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 54.
35
ICC RPE 17(2)(a).
36
Id. 17(2)(a)(iii).
37
Id. 17(2)(a)(iv).
38
Id. 87(1).
39
Id. 59(2).
40
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-475, supra note 24, ¶ 56.
41
See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2582, Judgment on the appeal of
the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled “Decision on the
Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143
or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU”, ¶ 50 n. 117 (Oct. 8,
2010) (“Although in this appeal the intermediary is neither a victim nor a witness, the Appeals Chamber
has previously held that other persons at risk may be considered to fit within the framework established for
such protection.”).
42
See ICC RPE 85(b) (stating that “victims may include organizations or institutions”).
43
Id. 85(a).

34

110

Vol. 11:1]

Philip Sandick

suffered harm that was 3) caused by actions that 4) make up a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court.44
¶21
Prior to the issuance of an indictment, though, it is impossible to know with
certainty whether the actions make up any particular crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court. Indeed, that is precisely what the PTC determines when deciding whether or not
an indictment is merited. Accordingly, when a person applies for victim status at the
preliminary stages of the proceedings, the Court will use the same burden of proof for
victimhood that it uses to grant procedural rights to those under investigation by the OTP.
That is, the ICCSt article 55(2) “grounds to believe” standard will be used to determine if
the victims has met the four requirements in ICC RPE 85(a).45 The Court has significant
discretion in making this determination.46
¶22
At the arrest warrant stage, the burden becomes “reasonable grounds to believe.”47
After that, at the confirmation of charges hearing, the PTC may very well decide that
some or all charges cannot be confirmed against some or all of the accused.48 In this third
test of the Prosecution’s evidence, the standard is “substantial grounds to believe” a
person has committed a specific crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.49 When the
Prosecutor does not present evidence to meet this higher bar, the PTC does not confirm
that charge against the accused. When that happens, victims whose participation was
granted based on the unconfirmed crime become non-victims, at least before the Court
itself.50
¶23
Victims can lose their status in other ways, too. For example, if at any point in the
trial new evidence emerges that invalidates the grounds upon which a victim’s
application was granted, victim status can be revoked.51 In its first decision on principles
to be applied in reparations proceedings, Trial Chamber I held that the “balance of
probabilities”52 (akin to the U.S. “preponderance of the evidence”53) standard should
44

See ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the
Applications for participation in the proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS4, VPRS 5 and VPRS
6 (Public Redacted Version), ¶ 79 (Jan. 17, 2006). It should be noted that some ICC judges combine
elements two and three. See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gagbo, ICC-01/11-01/11-384-Corr,
Corrigendum to the Second Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and
in the Related Proceedings, ¶ 24 (Feb. 6, 2013).
45
See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, ¶¶ 99–100, supra note
44.
46
See Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-101, Decision on victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06,
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ¶13 (Aug. 10, 2007).
47
ICCSt art. 58.
48
See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor v. Matthieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article
74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and
Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v. Callixte
Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the confirmation of charges (Dec. 16, 2011).
49
ICCSt art. 61(5).
50
ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-933-tENG, Decision on the treatment of applications for
participation, ¶ 11 (Feb. 26, 2009).
51
Id. ¶ 12.
52
ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/06-01/08-2904, Decision establishing the principles
and procedures to be applied to reparations, ¶ 253 (Aug. 7, 2012).
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apply to victims attempting to prove their victimhood. It is difficult—but not
impossible—to imagine a situation in which a victim met the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard at the trial phase but then could not meet the “balance of probabilities”
standard at the reparations phase. Evidence spoliation comes to mind. However, the mere
fact that there is a bar at all for individuals who already made it through the entire trial as
victims is quite telling. One’s status as a victim in front of the Court is always in
question.
¶24
On the other hand, it appears that the test for whether someone is “at risk on
account of the activities of the Court” does not change throughout proceedings. The
Court has held—albeit only at the Trial Chamber level54—that the test the VWU shall
apply is whether, following careful investigation, a witness “faces an established danger
of harm or death.”55 While not explicitly endorsing a standard of proof, the TC clarified
that “protection shall be afforded to any witness, following careful investigation, if he or
she is exposed to (“faces”) an evidence-based (“established”) danger of harm or death.”56
The Court went on to state: “an established danger of harm can include physical as well
as psychological harm.”57
III. SYSTEMS IN PLACE
A. Victim Trauma Arrangements
¶25

The Court understands its duties to victims, witnesses, and those at risk on account
of the work of the Court. Between the VWU, the Public Information and Documentation
Section (PIDS), the Victim Participation and Reparation Section (VPRS), the Office of
Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), and the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV), the Rome
System provides specialized avenues for engagement with victims and is now
implementing its second strategy in relation to victims. Like the Intermediary
Guidelines, the author worked on this Revised Strategy58 during his time at the Court.
¶26
The OTP is usually the first organ of the Court to interact with victims. The OTP
has set up a separate unit—the Protection Strategies Unit (PSU)—to facilitate and be the
focal point for contact with the VWU.59 The OTP also contains the OTP Gender and
Children Unit (GCU). Vedrana Mladina, who has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, was the
first appointee to the GCU.60 Mladina has created a significant system of guidelines and
53

See id. ¶ 253 n. 439 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary in describing “balance of the probabilities” as
“sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other”).
54
ICC Trial Chamber decisions are not binding on other chambers.
55
ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/06-01/08-1557, Decision on the prosecution and
defence applications for leave to appeal the Trial Chamber’s “Decision on Disclosure Issues,
Responsibilities for Protective Measures and other Procedural Matters”, ¶ 27 (Dec. 16, 2008).
56
Id. (emphasis omitted).
57
Id. ¶ 29.
58
ICC, Court’s revised strategy in relation to victims, ICC-ASP-11/38 (Nov. 5, 2012).
59
The PSU’s existence is only publicly evidenced in job announcements. See, e.g., Team Leader, EUROPA
NU, http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vii360ztzjyr/team_leader; Protection Strategies Assistant, EUROPEAN
INFORMATION AND RESEARCH NETWORK ON PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY,
http://euparl.net/9353000/1/j9vvhskmycle0vf/vig68l9lv7zt.
60
Interview with Vedrana Mladina, Associate Victims Expert, Gender and Children Unit, Office of the
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, in The Hague, Neth. (Feb. 27, 2012).

112

Vol. 11:1]

Philip Sandick

protection and support measures for the OTP.61 Some of the materials that make up the
OTP arsenal include:








guidelines for interviewing victims of SGBV;
guidelines for interviewing children;
a child-friendly court introduction;
the “dos and don’ts” for interviewing victims of SGBV and
children;
a “very detailed” questionnaire to assess SGBV;
portions of the “OTP Manual” (nicknamed, “The Bible”) that
address interviewing; and
a lessons learned document that was compiled by an “honest and
open” review of their work with victims.62

¶27

The one bit of information about the interview process Mladina could reveal was
that, in the interview process, “everything starts with free narrative.”63 As is typical in the
field, they generally endorse the “cognitive interview” model, which is discussed in
Section III below.64
¶28
On top of the available materials listed above, Mladina facilitates special trainings
for OTP staff members on such topics as how to interview victims of SGBV and how to
examine children and SGBV victims in court.65 She also teaches a module on
psychosocial aspects of interviewing at the Institute for International Criminal
Investigations.66 Thus, the Organ of the Court that typically has the first interview with
victims—after they are put in touch through an intermediary—seems to have robust
measures in place to ensure that interviewing traumatized individuals proceeds in a
measured and safe way.
¶29
If testimony may compromise a victim, the OTP does not continue with that victim.
That is, if the psychosocial assessment done by Mladina or her colleagues evidences that
the victim would not be able to testify without further damaging effects, she does not let
the OTP continue with that victim. Perhaps remarkably, the OTP listens. “The position of
the [former] Prosecutor—and I assume the [current] Prosecutor will adhere to this—has
always been he will give up a case, he will lose a case, rather than jeopardize a
witness.”67
¶30
After a victim is chosen to be a witness, they are handed over to the VWU. The
VWU performs its own assessments and “[i]n some cases the VWU is provided with
61

Id. The multiple levels of assessment through which a victim must go, while not the topic of this paper,
are quite extensive: an assessment prior to being selected for an interview, a full security and psychosocial
assessment prior to the interview itself, the interview, a follow-up assessment, possibly an assessment to
determine whether the victim will be able to testify in The Hague, and then a protection assessment.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.iici.info/pages/index.php.
67
Sara Criscitelli, Prosecution Coordinator, Transcript, International Criminal Court, Atrocity Crimes
Litigation Year in Review Conference 2011, The Hague, Neth. (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/humanrights/documents/ACL2011ConferenceTranscript.pdf.
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medical records by external health care professionals concerning the witness within the
VWU’s care.”68 The VWU also works with the OTP PSU and requests specific
information from the GCU as appropriate (such as family history and medical history,
which the OTP already would have collected).69 However, because the VWU and the
OTP are completely independent and have very good reasons not to share information,70
information flow is not as fluid as it might be in other organizations.
¶31
When the VWU deems it appropriate, it can request special measures to protect the
psychological well-being of victims. To do so, the Chambers and the VWU have
established a vulnerability protocol.71 The protocol includes optional measures such as
starting testimony with a free narrative phase and following the pace of the witness.72
Thus, like the OTP, the VWU has a system of assessments and victim care that is
significantly developed.
¶32
The unit that perhaps has the most interaction with victims who must tell their
stories is the VPRS. Because VPRS is primarily responsible for filling out victim
applications, workers and intermediaries from this unit have significant interaction with
victim narratives.73 These applications come from thousands of victims who seek to be
recognized as victims under Rule 85, to participate in the proceedings under article 68, or
to be considered for reparations under article 75.
¶33
As of mid-2012, VPRS had five field posts in total. VPRS sometimes trains
intermediaries so they can more effectively fill out applications.74 On occasions when
VPRS is ordered to contact large numbers of victims themselves, they hire a consultant to
prepare a methodology for a particular series of interviews.75 In the past, they have also
asked VWU for help.76 When VPRS hires consultants, the resulting training packages
become part of the resources of the unit. In that sense, VPRS has interviewing guidelines
at their disposal.
B. Widespread Use of Intermediaries Increases Potential for Intermediary Trauma
¶34

As elucidated in the Guidelines and recognized by all who work at the Court,
intermediaries come in many flavors.77 There are those chosen by the Court, there are
those chosen by victims, and there are those who self-appoint. Intermediaries—even a
single intermediary—can work with multiple organs and units of the Court and Counsel.
Mostly, these include those organs and units mentioned above: the OTP, the OPCV, the

68

ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/06-01/08-2166, Victims and Witnesses Unit report
on confidentiality of medical records and consent to disclose medical records, ¶ 16 (Nov. 2, 2009).
69
Mladina interview, supra note 60.
70
The VWU may not deal with evidence, and the OTP must protect its prosecutorial independence.
71
See ICC, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/0501/08-974-Anx2, Protocol on the
vulnerability assessment and support procedure used to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable witnesses, 9
(Oct. 25, 2010).
72
Id.
73
Interview with Fiona McKay, Chief of VPRS, International Criminal Court, in The Hague, Neth. (Mar. 8,
2012).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Guidelines, supra note 10, at 6.
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VPRS, the PIDS, the TFV, and defense counsel. The VWU, it deserves noting, does not
use intermediaries.
During the preliminary examination and investigation phases, intermediaries
ideally act only as the link between the OTP and the victims. In this capacity, they
connect the OTP to potential witnesses and/or sources of evidence. Again, in an ideal
world, the OTP would then be in touch with the victim directly to start the process of
evidence collection.
As the Trial Chamber found in both Lubanga78 and Ngudjolo,79 that is not what
happens. Instead, as a defense consultant at the ICC put it, the OTP outsources a great
deal of its investigations.80
Having intermediaries investigate is problematic for a number of reasons.81 First,
while intermediaries may help and assist, “they should not be called upon to undertake
the core functions of the Court.”82 Investigating is a core function of the OTP. Second,
this method of evidence is rife with quality and neutrality concerns.83 But most
importantly for this analysis, it exposes intermediaries and victims to the risks of
vicarious traumatization and retraumatization, respectively.
The Guidelines recognize that exposing intermediaries to close victim interaction
also potentially exposes them to trauma, whether or not the intermediaries are
investigating. It deals with supporting traumatized intermediaries in section 4.5, stating,
“the Court will, where appropriate, provide referrals to local organizations that provide
psychological care and support.”84
The IRRI/OSJI commentary on this section of the Guidelines is worth relaying here
in toto:
During the consultations in drafting this Commentary, the need for
psycho-social care for intermediaries working with victims and witnesses
was particularly emphasized as a matter that appears to be
underappreciated to date. Due to the multiple threats to which
intermediaries may be exposed, in addition to stresses and responsibilities
created by interacting with victims and witnesses, intermediaries are often
acutely in need of psychosocial care and support. While welcoming the
ICC’s recognition of the referral role of the ICC, we would suggest in
appropriate cases, e.g. where such provision goes to the heart of the
effective and safe completion of the requested intermediary task itself or
where the intermediary has suffered or is likely to suffer significant

78

See ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012).
79
See Prosecutor v. Matthieu Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute (Dec. 18, 2012).
80
See Buisman, supra note 2.
81
Id.
82
Guidelines, supra note 10, at 2.
83
See Buisman, supra note 2.
84
Guidelines, supra note 10, at 14.
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psychological harm as a result of fulfilling the tasks assigned to him/her
by the ICC, that such care be provided for directly by the ICC.85
¶40

In addition to the IRRI/OSJI Commentary, the Victims’ Rights Working Group
(VRWG) also published a report on outstanding issues in the ICC’s Draft Guidelines. The
VRWG’s report couched its recommendations, like this article, in the obligations of the
Court under its Statute: “some identified categories of intermediaries should
automatically receive training on preventative protection and basic trauma awareness in
view of the Court’s obligation to protect victims under Article 68(1) of the Statute.”86 The
VRWG went on to suggest in-house training and training manuals that address
“techniques and methodologies for carrying out various tasks in which intermediaries are
engaged.”87 Interviewing trauma survivors is one such task.
IV. THE TRAUMA OF TRAUMA INTERVIEWING

¶41

There are myriad methods used to analyze the effects of testimony. While these
methods use different terminology and formulate their respective analyses based on
different theoretical underpinnings, all methods point to the same conclusion:
interviewing can be helpful and hurtful.
A. Narrative Theory

¶42

In narrative theory, human beings create meaning through narrative.88 Practitioners
of social constructivist psychology,89 narrative medicine,90 and other fields91 who follow
this school of thought assert that past events and experiences do not merely exist in an
ether of disconnected memories, but are contextualized—narrativized—to give meaning
to the overall arch of one’s life. That overall arch can vary depending on one’s outlook.
For example, the same traumatic past can leave one feeling victimized, hopeful for a
brighter future, both, or neither. Whatever the story line or particular facts, a narrative
creates coherence.92

85

IRRI/OSJI, supra note 8, at 21.
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, VRWG, INTERMEDIARIES’ GUIDELINES: OUTSTANDING ISSUES 3
(Apr. 2011), http://www.vrwg.org/VRWG_DOC/2011_VRWG_Intermediaries.pdf. Of course, as the Court
has held, there is a duty to protect intermediaries as well.
87
Id. at 7.
88
See D.P. POLKINGHORNE, NARRATIVE KNOWLEDGE AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1988); see also DAVID
HERMAN, JAMES PHELAN, PETER J. RABINOWITZ, BRIAN RICHARDSON & ROBYN WARHOL, NARRATIVE
THEORY: CORE CONCEPTS AND CRITICAL DEBATES (2012).
89
See MICHELE CROSSLEY, INTRODUCING NARRATIVE MEDICINE: SELF, TRAUMA, AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF MEANING 3–10 (2000) (explaining different psychological approaches to the study of self and identity).
90
See id.; Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection, Profession, and Trust, 286 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1897 (2001).
91
See, e.g., Ronald R. Irwin, Narrative Competence and Constructive Development Theory: A Proposal for
Writing the Bildungsroman in the Postmodern World, 3 J. ADULT DEV. 109 (1996); JEROME BRUNER, ACTS
OF MEANING (1990).
92
See CHARLOTTE LINDE, LIFE STORIES: THE CREATION OF COHERENCE (1993).
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¶43

Psychiatrist Dori Laub has published widely on massive psychic trauma and
survivor testimony.93 Laub, a member of the narrative theory school, believes
psychological trauma’s main affect can be described as a fracture of one’s narrative.94
Others who have studied survivor testimony have come to similar conclusions.95
¶44
According to Laub et al., the traumatic moment is an incongruous exception to the
linear structure of one’s internal life story. In short, it is de-narrativized. By telling one’s
story to another human being, the speaker is able to build bridges across disparate stored
events. In this way, autobiographical interviews can allow one to go “from
speechlessness to narrative,”96 thereby situating this type of interview as an important
tool within the holistic toolkit for healing the survivors’ “shattered” lives.97
1. Witnessing
¶45

Traumatic events are de-narrativized because, Laub asserts, human beings who
witness a man-made traumatic event, including most of what would qualify as genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes,98 witness the collapse of human community. In
the human community, Person A should never do that thing to Person B. When Person B
cries for her very life, Person A should stop and listen. But Person A does not.
¶46
Under an Object-Relations theory, the victim’s unheeded cries for help cause the
victim to “reexperienc[e] the earliest childhood imagery of fantasized horrors of
helplessness, worthlessness, and castration.”99 The trauma of witnessing this act, whether
as victim or bystander, becomes “unspeakable and unrepresentable and . . . marked by
forgetting and dissociation.”100 For the witness to these crimes, there simply is “no
empathic companion who is willing to listen and respond to one’s needs.”101
¶47
The traumatic event becomes “an ‘absent’ experience because at the core of the
executioner-victim interaction all human relatedness is undone.”102 The story of the
traumatic event is “never known, told, or remembered. . . . No perception of the event is
93

See, e.g., Dori Laub, From Speechlessness to Narrative: The Cases of Holocaust Historians and of
Psychiatrically Hospitalized Survivors, 24 LITERATURE AND MEDICINE 253 (2005); see also KIM
WORTHINGTON, SELF AS NARRATIVE (1996); Allesandro Portelli, What Makes Oral History Different, in
THE DEATH OF LUIGI TRASTULLI AND OTHER STORIES: FORM AND MEANING IN ORAL HISTORY (1991);
Mary Marshall Clark, Holocaust Video Testimony, Oral History, and Narrative Medicine: The Struggle
against Indifference, 24 LITERATURE AND MEDICINE 266 (2005).
94
See Laub, supra note 93.
95
See, e.g., Nanette C. Auerhahn & Dori Laub, Annihilation and Restoration: Post-Traumatic Memory as
Pathway and Obstacle to Recovery, 11 INT’L REV. OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 327 (1984); Stevan Weine & Dori
Laub, Narrative Constructions of Historical Realities in Testimony with Bosnian Survivors of “Ethnic
Cleansing”, 58 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 246 (1995).
96
See Laub, supra note 93.
97
See Dori Laub, Introduction to the English-Language Edition: Survivors’ Silence and the Difficulty of
Knowing, in AT THE SIDE OF TORTURE SURVIVORS: TREATING A TERRIBLE ASSAULT ON HUMAN DIGNITY
xv, xxi (Sepp Graessner, M.D., Norbert Gurris & Christian Pross, M.D. eds., 2001).
98
These three crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the Court per ICCSt article 5.
99
Laub, supra note 97.
100
Laub, supra note 93.
101
Id.
102
Dori Laub, Breaking the Silence of the Muted Witness: Video Testimonies of Psychiatrically
Hospitalized Holocaust Survivors in Israel, in LESSONS AND LEGACIES VIII: FROM GENERATION TO
GENERATION 175, 178 (Doris L. Bergen ed., 2008).
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translated into symbolizing words; no narrative is formed. In a very important sense,”
Laub writes, “the event has not yet been experienced.”103 What is left is a memory
without a narrative, an event without meaning, a human being without a community.
PTSD results.
2. First Witnessing
¶48

Because the event has not yet been experienced, the interview setting provides
fertile ground for narrativizing and creating meaning out of the event for the first time. As
Laub explains:
What the giving and receiving of testimony does is to set in motion a
dyadic-dialogic process. The listener-companion, in his or her total
presence, offers the possibility and the protected holding space, within
which the internal other, or Thou, can be reestablished, necessary to face
the traumatic event. The story is told both to the listener and to oneself,
and the process of narrativization unfolds.104

¶49

The interviewer, by actively listening and thereby taking part in the process of
meaning creation, does not merely record the testimony of the witness to the traumatic
event. Rather, she herself becomes a “first witness” to the event. The interviewee literally
re-lives the event as the interviewer watches and listens.
¶50
Laub’s paper, “From Speechlessness to Narrative,” contained findings of
interviews with twenty-six chronically hospitalized Holocaust survivors.105 Each
interview was between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half hours long. Extensive
psychological testing was performed both before and five months after the interviews.
Interviewed individuals showed a decrease of PTSD symptoms “of close to 50 percent. A
control group of survivors who had not given testimony showed no decrease of such posttraumatic symptoms after the five-month interval. After this group also gave testimony,
[Laub] saw the same results.”106
¶51
This experiment demonstrates the potential for the positive impact of interviews on
interviewees. Studies specific to giving legal testimony, including some specific to war
crimes tribunals, have found the same potential for positive effects of giving testimony.107
3. Caveant Orator et Auditor
¶52

Those same studies and others point also to the possible negative effects of giving
testimony, both for the speaker and the listener. In a Canadian study of survivors of
childhood sexual abuse, all ninety-three participants responded that giving testimony
103

Laub, supra note 93, at 257.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 262.
107
See, e.g., Catherine C. Byrne, Benefit or Burden: Victims’Reflections on TRC Participation, 10 PEACE
AND CONFLICT: J OF PEACE PSYCHOL. 237–56 (2004); Ulrika Funkeson et al., Witnesses to Genocide:
Experiences of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts, 17 PEACE AND CONFLICT: J OF PEACE PSYCHOL.
367–88 (2011).
104
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“disrupted lives and relationships . . . [causing] nausea and vomiting, as well as
psychological distress.”108 Two studies of women who gave testimony in Rwandan
domestic Gacaca courts found that the experience had the potential to cause trauma.109
Countless other studies found the same result.110
¶53
In addition, it was not uncommon for emotions “stirred up” during the course of
giving testimony to continue to affect the witness after the trial.111 Studies outside of
giving legal testimony also demonstrate the possibility for negative impact of interviews
on interviewees.112 Still other studies have found that a neutral-impact interview may not
exist, at least from the interviewee’s perspective.113 That is, an investigatory interview
can be positive or negative, but not neutral.
¶54
The effect on the interviewer—the First Witness—is also significant.
Vicarious/Secondary Traumatization is widely recognized in the psychological literature
on trauma interviewers. While “Vicarious Traumatization” was initially coined with
reference to psychotherapists who worked with trauma survivors,114 other studies have
extended the concept’s application to virtually all persons who assist and work with
trauma survivors. These individuals include healthcare providers,115 journalists,116 first
responders,117 clergy,118 and, most relevant to this study, attorneys,119 humanitarian
workers,120 and other professionals within the justice system.121
108

Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. OF
TRAUMATIC STRESS 159–66 (2003).
109
Funkeson et al., supra note 107; Karen Brounéus, Truth-Telling as Talking Cure? Insecurity and
Retraumatization in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts, 39 SECURITY DIALOGUE 55–76 (2008).
110
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 107; Trudy de Ridder, The Trauma of Testifying: Deponents’ Difficult
Healing Process, 6 TRACK TWO (1997),
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/track2/track2_v6_n3_a14.htm.
111
Funkeson et al., supra note 107, at 376.
112
See, e.g., Rebecca Campbell, What really happened? A validation study of rape survivors’ help-seeking
experiences with the legal and medical systems, 20 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 1, 55 (2005) (explaining
“police officers and doctors significantly underestimated the impact they were having on survivors. Victims
reported significantly more post-system-contact distress than service providers thought they were
experiencing.”).
113
See, e.g., Donna S. Martsloff et al., A Meta-Summary of Qualitative Findings about Professional
Services for Survivors of Sexual Violence, 15 QUALITATIVE REPORT 3, 489 (2010) (“Findings indicated that
qualities of professional service providers and outcomes of professional services were perceived either
positively or negatively (rather than neutrally) by survivors, regardless of the provider’s professional
discipline. Professionals who work with sexual violence survivors can use these findings to improve their
practices.”).
114
See I.L. McCann & Laurie A. Pearlman, Vicarious Traumatization: A framework for understanding the
psychological effects of working with victims, 3 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 1, 131 (1990).
115
See Paula A. Madrid & Stephanie J. Schacher, A Critical Concern: Pediatrician Self-Care After
Disasters, 117 PEDIATRICS 454 (2006).
116
See Siddarth A. Shah, Mental Health Emergencies and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, in EMERGENCY
PUBLIC HEALTH: PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 493 (G.B. Kapur & J.P. Smith eds., 2010).
117
See id.
118
See JACKSON H. DAY, ELIZABETH VERMILYEA, JENNIFER WILKERSON, & ESTHER GILLER, RISKING
CONNECTION IN FAITH COMMUNITIES: A TRAINING CURRICULUM FOR FAITH LEADERS SUPPORTING
TRAUMA SURVIVORS (2006).
119
See Andrew P. Levin, M.D. & Scott Greisberg, M.A., Vicarious Trauma in Attorneys, 24 PACE L. REV.
245 (2003).
120
See Siddarth A. Shah, Elizabeth Garland, & Craig Katz, Secondary Traumatic Stress: Prevalence for
Humanitarian Aid Workers in India, 13 TRAUMATOLOGY 59 (2007); Laurie A. Pearlman & Lisa McKay,
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Laub himself recognized the countertransference of the interviewer. Laub
experienced “vicarious traumatization through witnessing to an instance of genocide”
which caused a “loss of coherent speech.”122 Joan Lansen, another trauma psychologist,
described the countertransference and gave reasons why it is more prone to happen in
atrocity crime situations:
all intensive work with “man-made disasters” (when humans are
tormented by human hand) . . . requires very personal participation by the
therapist . . . . Naturally, this work does something to us. It can deprive us
of our sleep, and it can cause burnout. It can influence our behavior at
home and among colleagues; it can turn us into annoying people. We can
develop the same symptoms as our patients: tension, depression, and
severe anxiety.123
C. Neuroscience

¶56

Neuroscience provides a “harder” explanation for the salience of trauma
interviews.124 That explanation starts out by noting that memory and stress are intimately
interrelated, as first recognized by Yerkes and Dodson.125
¶57
The Yerkes-Dodson law shows that some stress is good for memory, while too
much stress impedes it.126 The physiological reason is widely thought to involve
glucocorticoids, which are released by the basal ganglia upon encountering a stressor.127
Too many glucocorticoids can effectively paralyze the hippocampus.128
¶58
The hippocampus is responsible for working memory and binding/consolidating
working memories into long-term episodic memories.129 Episodic memories are those
autobiographical memories in which we remember ourselves participating in activities.130
When the hippocampus is paralyzed by an overflow of glucocorticoids, working memory
is impeded, and disparate events are not bound together into coherent episodic
memories.131

Understanding and Addressing Vicarious Trauma, HEADINGTON INSTITUTE (2009),
http://www.headington-institute.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2646.
121
See JEAN K. PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS 2007: ETHICAL AND
PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (3d ed. 2007).
122
Laub, supra note 93, at 255.
123
Johan Lansen, What Does This Work Do To Us?, in AT THE SIDE OF TORTURE SURVIVORS 198, 198–99
(Sepp Graessner, M.D., Norbert Gurris & Christian Pross, M.D. eds., 1996).
124
See, e.g., Chris R. Bowen, A cognitive neuroscience account of posttraumatic stress disorder and its
treatment, 39 BEHAVIORAL RES. & THERAPY 373 (2001).
125
See Robert M. Yerkes & John Dillingham Dodson, The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of
habit-formation, 18 J. OF COMP. NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHOL. 459 (1908).
126
See id.
127
S.J. Lupien, F. Maheu, M. Tu, A. Fiocco & T.E. Schramek, The effects of stress and stress hormones on
human cognition: Implications for the field of brain and cognition, 65 BRAIN AND COGNITION 209 (2007).
128
Id.
129
See, e.g., ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON’T GET ULCERS (1998).
130
Id.
131
Id.
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¶59

The amygdala, however, thrives in situations of increased glucocorticoid
concentration.132 The amygdala is the part of the brain largely responsible for processing
memory and causing immediate emotional reactions.133 It also stores heightened
emotional memories.134 Metcalfe and Jacobs have called this the “hot” memory system,
where the hippocampus-based memory system is the “cool” one.135
¶60
Unfortunately, the amygdala is very bad at binding memories together.136 This
deficiency accounts for the “weapon focus” of those who experience the trauma of being
mugged at gunpoint: individuals can remember very clearly and accurately the gun, but
their attention is focused and their memory of other aspects of the situation (say, height
and weight of the shooter) is severely impaired.137 Thus, for a victim of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the court (or any other trauma), heightened glucocorticoid concentration
will likely have led to ineffective binding of memories and a resulting fracture in the
victim’s narrative memory. In those cases, the memory will actually reside in another part
of the brain—that is bad at binding.
¶61
Neuroscience has only begun to study the effects of narrativizing one’s traumatic
memories. Preliminary research, however, shows that the way an interviewee is asked to
relay events can have an effect on the extent of their amygdala activation.138 Of course, it
is well accepted in cognitive behaviorism that that prolonged exposure to a stressor can
reduce the response to that stressor,139 so the key is finding a stressor that is not overly
burdensome at every exposure. Crucially in this regard, the preliminary research
mentioned above found that asking victims of trauma to go straight into talking about the
trauma caused the same neurological signals as the trauma itself.140
D. Investigative Interviewing
¶62

Trauma’s effect on narrative (and vice versa) has not gone unnoticed in the
investigative interviewing field, either. After lamenting the lack of interview training and
theory for investigators, Fisher and Geiselman developed the cognitive interview in the
early 1980s.141 The immediate goal was to create a style of interviewing that would assist
and enhance recall.142
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Id.
See Benno Roozendaal, Bruce S. McEwen & Sumantra Chattarji, Stress, memory and the amygdala, 10
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 423 (2009).
134
Id.
135
Janet Metcalfe & W.J. Jacobs, A “hot-system/cool-system” view of memory under stress, 7 PTSD RES.
Q. (2006).
136
See Roozendaal et al., supra note 133.
137
Id.
138
See Bessel A. Van Der Kolk, Clinical Implications of Neuroscience Research in PTSD, ANNALS OF THE
N.Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 1 (2006).
139
Rachel Yehuda & Joseph LeDoux, Response Variation following Trauma: A Translational
Neuroscience Approach to Understanding PTSD, 56 NEURON 19, 22 (2007).
140
Van Der Kolk, supra note 138.
141
See RONALD P. FISHER & R.E. GEISELMAN, MEMORY-ENHANCING TECHNIQUES FOR INVESTIGATIVE
INTERVIEW: THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW (1992).
142
See Ulf Holmberg, Investigative Interviewing as a therapeutic jurisprudential approach, in
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING 149, 156 (Tom Williamson, Becky
Milne & Stephen P. Savage eds., 2009).
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¶63

The “cognitive interview” developed into the “enhanced cognitive interview,”
which was, in turn, adapted into the “spaced cognitive interview”143 (SCI) for victims
who showed “anxiety-hindered narration.”144 The hindrance, as recognized by
investigative interviewers, is due to trauma confronted at each attempt to talk about the
stressful memory.145
¶64
SCI deals with confrontation of trauma by spacing out narration. The spacing
allows the victim to confront the stressor for a prolonged period of time in a supportive
environment.146 It encourages establishing rapport and asking open-ended questions. By
doing so, SCI operationalizes the cognitive behaviorism theory that psychological reexperience through a narrative structure reduces the anxiety that originates from
traumatic experiences.147
¶65
Many studies have been done on SCI to establish whether or not it indeed reduces
the anxiety originating from traumatic events. These studies found that the perceived
amount of respect an interviewer has for an interviewee has a strong effect on ability and
willingness to recall.148 As one victim put it:
It was easier for me to talk to people who acted properly because people
who interview people, they should not punish you, but they can do so just
by their way of talking, showing their hate for me as a human being, and
at that moment you turn around and return their hate.149
¶66

This quote shows both the positive and the negative effects of establishing rapport
on the attitude of the interviewee and the interviewee’s subsequent desire (and maybe
even ability) to recall.
¶67
In an attempt to empirically establish the utility of the cognitive interview,
researchers created experiments150 based on Antonovsky’s concept of “sense of
coherence” (SOC).151 According to Antonovsky, one’s SOC comprises three different
feelings: comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness.152 Holmberg elaborates
on these three feelings:
[t]he first, the cognitive component comprehensibility, refers to the degree
to which individuals perceive information, about themselves and the
143

Eric Shepherd & Rebecca Milne, Full and Faithful: Ensuring Quality Practice and Integrity of
Outcomes in Witness Interviews, in ANALYSING WITNESS TESTIMONY: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 124 (Anthony Heaton-Armstrong, Eric Shepherd & David
Wolchover eds., 1999).
144
Holmberg, supra note 142, at 157.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
See J.W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF EXPRESSING EMOTIONS (1997).
148
Alexander Todorov & John A. Bargh, Automatic Sources of Aggression, 7 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR 53 (2002).
149
Holmberg, supra note 142, at 160.
150
See Ann E. Auhagen, On the Psychology of Meaning of Life, 59 SWISS J. OF PSYCHOL. 34 (2000).
151
See Aaron Antonovsky, The Sense of Coherence as a Determinant of Health, in BEHAVIORAL HEALTH:
A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ENHANCEMENT AND DISEASE PREVENTION (Joseph D. Matarazzo et al., eds.,
1984).
152
Id.
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environment, as structured, predictable and comprehensible. The second
instrumental component, manageability, refers to whether individuals
perceive their personal and social resources as sufficient to cope with
demands posed by internal and external stimuli. The third motivational
component, meaningfulness, is the emotional counterpart of
comprehensibility; it refers to how individuals feel that their lives make
sense emotionally and to the extent that they perceive stressful experiences
as requiring them to invest time, energy and effort.153
¶68

Researchers in this study showed that individuals who experienced a
“humanitarian” police interview—one containing open-ended questions and in which
rapport was established—had a higher SOC than those who felt themselves less respected
by the police.154 Another study of eighty-three crime victims also found that victims who
“perceived a high humanitarian approach from their police interviewer reported a
significantly higher SOC than those who perceived a low humanitarian approach.”155
While these studies can show only correlation and not causality, the correlation is clear:
interviewing correlates with emotional response.
¶69
Some victims may even value proper treatment more than a guilty verdict. The
seminal study in this field assessed whether victims were more concerned with “decision
control” or “process control,” and ended up finding the latter. 156 In the study, “decision
control” related to the control a victim had over the outcome of the trial, and “process
control” related to the control a victim had over the judicial process, whatever the
outcome of that process might turn out to be. The data indicated that victims were
willing to forego decision control if it meant they retained process control.
¶70
Subsequent studies corroborated this finding, reinforcing the theory that
“procedural justice” is often more important to victims than “distributive justice.”157 The
importance of procedural justice makes sense, given that victims often have no ability to
measure their distributive outcome against the outcome of others.158 Even without any
information about others, victims can always measure how they have been treated
throughout their own judicial process.159
¶71
But while judging distributive justice is fairly easy, judging procedural justice is
not so easy, at least at first glance. If a victim loses a goat, and the judicial process that
convicts a person then orders that person to give the victim a goat or the money to buy a
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replacement goat, that just seems fair.160 More fundamentally, because the outcomes of
distributive justice—the distributions themselves—are generally either black and white
(conviction/acquittal) or monetizable (how much money the victim receives), judging
that type of justice is usually straightforward.
¶72
Judging procedural justice is less straightforward. Generally, research shows that,
in order for victims to perceive their respective procedures as fair, they want:







¶73

to be treated with dignity and respect;
to be notified about important developments and informed about
their rights;
to receive victim support;
to receive protection from the accused;
to attend and participate in proceedings in order to have their
voices heard;
to receive reparation; and
to receive legal assistance.161

The ICC’s participation and reparation regime, coupled with the cognitive
interview, has the potential to offer all of the above. Moreover, since victims can become
non-victims throughout proceedings, thus becoming ineligible for distributive justice,
procedural justice at the ICC is that much more important.
V. FROM HERE TO THERE

¶74

The primary goal in this area should be to do as those at risk asked the Court to do:
to help them understanding how to work with traumatized individuals. The ICC has a
number of different options in this respect, even within the typical budgetary and
logistical constraints.
¶75
Other educational products made available by the Court evidence that some options
revolve around the PIDS, the VWU, and the OTP GCU getting together and creating
guidelines, a protocol, standards, pamphlets, videos, or similar instruments. The Court
already utilizes multiple digital and physical outreach devices, including a YouTube
video on “Being a Witness.”162 Between the work of the VWU and OTP staff, a bestpractices guide for interviewing traumatized individuals that is already sanctioned by at
least one unit or organ of the Court must exist. The PIDS could then create a video based
on the document(s), or simply put the document(s) online. Alternatively, the PIDS could
physically publish a single document as it did with its “Understanding the ICC”
pamphlet.
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¶76

Training sessions for intermediaries are also an option. It is not uncommon for
intermediaries to be trained after they are identified. What is uncommon is for them to be
trained in interviewing traumatized individuals. Indeed, it is unprecedented as far as the
author can tell.163 Of course, training sessions and online or physical material are not
mutually exclusive options.
¶77
If creation of a best-practices manual is not a viable option, then the Court should
at least point intermediaries to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring164 or the Istanbul Protocol.165 Both of
these documents recognize retraumatization and vicarious traumatization and contain
suggestions for coping.166 Another idea is to partner with an outside party—an education
or service institution, perhaps—to work alongside intermediaries and help them do the
Court’s hard work.
¶78
At the end of the day, the Court has made important advancements in protecting
and supporting victims, witnesses, intermediaries, and others who put themselves at risk
in order to advance the mission of international criminal justice. At this crucial stage of
guideline and strategy promulgation, the Court should take very seriously the results of
the expansive consultation process in which it engaged with regard to the Intermediary
Guidelines. Intermediaries are asking for help right now. To the extent possible within
available resources, the Court should support those who are suffering and who may suffer
by offering guidelines for interviewing individuals whose narratives have been fractured
by trauma.
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